Editorial: On the Benefits of Modeling Using QALYs for Societal Resource Allocation: The Model Is the Message  by Garrison, Louis P.
Editorial: On the Beneﬁts of Modeling Using QALYs for
Societal Resource Allocation: The Model Is the Message
Louis P. Garrison Jr, PhD
University of Washington, Seattle,WA, USA
While moderating a debate at the recent ISPOR meeting in
Athens, Professor Milt Weinstein suggested that maybe we
should focus more on the “LY” (life-years) and less on the “QA”
(quality-adjusted). I interpreted this comment to mean that
health state utilities are only one element in the larger bioclinical
models that are at the core of many cost-utility analyses. Typical
disease-based cost-utility models also include intermediate end
points to reﬂect disease progression, the probabilities of clinical
events, and projected survival, as well as the cost elements. The
focus of this quality-adjusted life-years (QALY) consensus devel-
opment workshop was, however, on health state utilities—one
element in the entire model. We have argued elsewhere that
similar beneﬁt-risk models, including health state utilities, could
be very helpful in making regulatory approval deliberations more
systematic and transparent [1]. In my view, the use of integrative,
quantitative models to assist health-care decision-makers is more
important than precisely how morbidity (i.e., health-related
quality of life) is reﬂected in those models.
On the whole, these articles provide a fair and very useful
representation of the current state of the debate about health
state utilities and preferences in our ﬁeld: namely, there remain
several persistent and contentious issues—both about the theory
and the practice. As noted, the ISPOR Consensus Development
Workshop was motivated by the challenge that Nobel laureate
Daniel Kahneman posed in his ISPOR address in 2005. He
reprises that argument about human adaptability to illness in his
contribution to this collection. Although these ﬁnal Workshop
articles did not resolve any of these issues, the Consensus Devel-
opment Group should be congratulated on fashioning eight high-
level principles [2] that capture the state of the debate as well as
a way forward, including the pragmatic next step of calling for
the development of a reference method for estimating QALYs. In
my view, this is a useful goal to pursue, but it will be helpful to
keep in mind some higher level distinctions that were either
implicit or unaddressed in these articles.
The Workshop articles did not explore two related founda-
tional issues in any depth: 1) the use of the QALY in normative
versus positive (or behavioral) economics; and 2) welfarism
versus extra-welfarism as a basis for the use of the QALY in
societal resource allocation.
Ex Ante versus Experienced Utility
First, the problem of whether to use ex ante versus “experienced”
utility was addressed, though not resolved. The answer to this
will depend on whether we are making normative societal
resource allocation decisions or trying to understand or predict
the behavior of patients. In any case, it is important to recognize
that individual preferences change and adapt and that individuals
are prone to errors and biases in decision-making under uncer-
tainty [3]. One interesting suggestion in these articles is a kind of
two-step procedure to inform those doing ex ante health state
preferences about the ratings of patients based on experienced
(i.e., ex post) utility. All of this raises an even more profound
question: should we be asking “predictably irrational” people [4]
about their preferences—either ex ante or ex post—when it
comes to normative (rather than behavioral) analysis? Or should
we be trying to determine what they would choose if they were
rational, and use that for social decision-making? Mention is
made of “equity-adjusted” QALYs. Maybe we should instead
be considering “irrationality-adjusted” QALYs? The expected
utility model that underlies cost-utility analysis provides a frame-
work for overcoming some of these biases and irrationalities, but
if the utility values themselves are biased, then the results can
be misleading. Until we resolve the issue of which utilities are
more rational and stable—experienced versus ex ante versus
experience-informed ex ante—our best approach to social
decision-making may be to develop a reference case method, as
recommended here, that is consistent even if potentially biased.
As fallible human beings making private decisions under con-
straints, we spend every day of our lives grappling with this
question of what is truly in our best interest: public resource
allocation decisions face the even greater challenge of aggregat-
ing those preferences.
Welfarism versus Extra-Welfarism
Second, when it comes to public resource allocation, where do
we stand in using QALYs? The pragmatic proponents of QALYs
would emphasize that no decision is, in fact, a decision, and that
we have to make resource allocation decisions, so let’s get on
with it. There seem to be two poles in the use of the QALY—the
UK and the US. Brouwer et al. [5] have recently provided a useful
summary and description of the differences between welfarism
and extra-welfarism that can help us to understand these poles.
Although this area has its own controversies [6], the key issue
seems to be that societies can choose to adopt policies that
override “consumer sovereignty.”
Among all health systems, the UK has the most developed and
consistent approach to using QALYs in resource allocation. The
basic principle—an extra-welfarist one—is that as a democratic
society, the majority of British citizens have supported a set of
public institutions that provide a national-level budget constraint
for health (a “ring-fenced” budget) and the maximization of
expected QALYs within that constraint. The reliance on the
QALY and the cost-utility modeling under this system is under-
standable and logical. Of course, this is not to say that all citizens
agree with this all of the time.
The United States is at the other pole: generally, QALYs and
pharmacoeconomic cost-effectiveness analyses are not explicitly
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or consistently considered by either private or public payers.
Being recommended by the Public Health Service Panel [7] for
the “reference case” analysis, QALYs and cost-utility analyses
show up primarily in academic publications and scientiﬁc meet-
ings. At best, but importantly, this economic evidence can inﬂu-
ence resource allocation implicitly through its impact on clinical
practice guidelines. This can create norms of care, which in turn
provide clinical, ethical, legal, and economic incentives that inﬂu-
ence practice.
Welfare economics and the market failure paradigm have
long provided a useful framework for understanding the special
economics of health care. The welfarist view is grounded in
consumer sovereignty and utilitarianism, and assumes that indi-
viduals vary in their preferences and generally have the best idea
of what is in their best interest. Different preferences clearly mean
different utility valuations: so, given the same information, dif-
ferent individuals would and do make different choices among
health interventions and between health and other goods.
Although health care is sometimes seen as a “merit good,” for
which individuals have preferences about other citizens’ access to
it, there is no ﬁxed global budget for health or any speciﬁc
percentage of GDP that is “right”—because it can easily change
for many reasons. There is no constant value of the QALY that
applies to all citizens: people make different choices.
Deﬁning a Minimum Beneﬁt Package
So what is the need for the QALY in such a “free-market” world?
First, given the challenges of the biases and complexities
in medical decision-making—as elucidated by Professor
Kahneman—physicians, patients, and payers may ﬁnd these cost-
utility analyses to be useful decision support tools as they con-
front these difﬁcult decisions. Second, if we posit that heath care
is a merit good, and that we, therefore, care that our fellow
citizens have access to some “minimum beneﬁt package,” then
we will care about what is made available in that package.
Admittedly, the current minimum in the United States is sketchy,
implicit, unreliable, and sometimes even disgraceful; nonetheless,
the safety net of Medicaid, emergency care, and cost-shifting
via uncompensated care is a kind of implicit national health
insurance [8].
Some major US reform proposals—from Enthoven’s Con-
sumer Choice Plan in 1978 [9] to the Emanuel-Fuchs voucher
plan of 2005 [10]—include the deﬁnition of a societal minimum
or universal beneﬁt package. Presumably, cost-utility models
(including QALYs) can provide a pragmatic tool for considering
inclusions and exclusions to that package. Clearly though, just as
in the UK, the vast majority of health sector spending (i.e.,
hospital and physician care) would be grandfathered in. In other
words, the prospect of an Oregon Medicaid-type zero-based
budget reconsideration of all medical services is probably not
feasible practically or politically, so that changes to the list of
covered beneﬁts might only occur slowly over time, focusing on
potential innovations. But with a more explicit national plan, the
United States would face—just as in the UK—the issue of whose
preferences to use for the national coverage decisions. The UK
has chosen to use the average health state preferences of the
general population as the standard for comparison. Based on
public ﬁnance theory, if an explicit minimum beneﬁt package
were adopted in the United States, then an interesting alternative
would be to consider the preferences of the median or “swing”
voter, who would in theory cast the deciding vote on the elements
of the package.
To conclude, it is important to recognize that at either pole,
we have to make social decisions—implicit, if not
explicit—about resource allocation. In my view, the use of cost-
utility models that use the QALY can be a pragmatic and neces-
sary tool to improve these complex decisions—often made under
conditions of considerable uncertainty and bias.
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